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We evaluated effectiveness of thermal passenger 
screening for 2019-nCoV infection at airport exit and 
entry to inform public health decision-making. In our 
baseline scenario, we estimated that 46% (95% con-
fidence interval: 36 to 58) of infected travellers would 
not be detected, depending on incubation period, sen-
sitivity of exit and entry screening, and proportion of 
asymptomatic cases. Airport screening is unlikely to 
detect a sufficient proportion of 2019-nCoV infected 
travellers to avoid entry of infected travellers.
As at 4 February 2020, 20,471 confirmed cases of novel 
coronavirus (2019-nCoV) have been reported from 
China with 425 deaths confirmed so far [1]. There were 
cases in at least 23 other countries, identified because 
of symptoms and recent travel history to Hubei prov-
ince, China. This strongly suggests that the reported 
cases constitute only a small fraction of the actual 
number of infected individuals in China [2]. While the 
most affected region, Hubei province, has ceased air 
travel and closed major public transport routes [3] the 
number of exported cases are still expected to increase 
[4].
Despite limited evidence for its effectiveness, airport 
screening has been previously implemented during the 
2003 SARS epidemic and 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pan-
demic to limit the probability of infected cases enter-
ing other countries or regions [5-7]. Here we use the 
available evidence on the incubation time, hospitalisa-
tion time and proportion of asymptomatic infections 
of 2019-nCoV to evaluate the effectiveness of exit and 
entry screening for detecting travellers entering Europe 
with 2019-nCoV infection. We also present an online 
tool so that results can be updated as new information 
becomes available.
 
Simulation of travellers at each stage of 
infection with 2019-nCoV
We simulated 100 2019-nCoV infected travellers plan-
ning to board a flight who would pose a risk for seed-
ing transmission in a new region. The duration of 
travel was considered as the flight time plus a small 
amount of additional travel time (ca 1 hour) for airport 
procedures. We assumed that infected individuals 
will develop symptoms, including fever, at the end of 
their incubation period (mean 5.2 days (Table)) [8] and 
progress to more severe symptoms after a few days, 
resulting in hospitalisation and isolation. We also took 
into account that individuals may have asymptomatic 
(subclinical) infection that would not be detected by 
thermal scanning or cause them to seek medical care, 
although these individuals may be infectious, and that 
infected travellers may exhibit severe symptoms dur-
ing their travel and be hospitalised upon arrival with-
out undergoing entry screening. We then estimated 
the proportion of infected travellers who would be 
detected by exit and entry screening, develop severe 
symptoms during travel, or go undetected, under vary-
ing assumptions of: (i) the duration of travel; (ii) the 
sensitivity of exit and entry screening; (iii) the propor-
tion of asymptomatic infections; (iv) the incubation 
period and (v) the time from symptom onset to hospi-
talisation (Table).
We assume that the time of starting travel is randomly 
and uniformly distributed between the time of infection 
and twice the expected time to severe disease, ensur-
ing that simulated travellers are travelling during their 
incubation period. However, we only consider those 
travellers who depart before their symptoms progress 
to being so severe that they would require hospital care 
[8]. We simulate travellers with individual incubation 
period, time from onset to severe disease, flight start 
times and detection success at exit and entry screen-
ing according to the screening sensitivities (Figure 1). 
An individual will be detected at exit screening if their 
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Table
Parameter values and assumptions for the baseline scenario estimating effectiveness of exit and entry screening at airports 
for detecting passengers infected with novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)
Parameter Value (baseline scenario) Source
Duration of travel 12 hours Beijing – London [18]
Sensitivity of exit screening 86% Sensitivity of infrared thermal image scanners [19]
Sensitivity of entry screening 86% Sensitivity of infrared thermal image scanners [19]
Proportion of asymptomatic infections undetectable 
by typical screening procedures 17%
1 of 6 reported asymptomatic in a 2019-nCoV family 
cluster [11]
Incubation period Mean 5.2 days, variance 4.1 days
Reported Gamma distributed mean, variance estimated 
from uncertainty interval of mean [8]
Time from symptom onset to hospitalisation Mean 9.1 days, variance 14.7 days
Reported Gamma distributed mean, variance estimated 
from uncertainty interval of mean [8]
Figure 1
Simulated infection histories of travellers infected with novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)
Detected at exit
Severe during flight
from incubating
Severe during flight
from symptomatic
Detected at entry
Undetected
-16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2
Days since flight departure
Period Symptomatic SevereIncubation
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The incubation period begins on infection and travellers then progress to being symptomatic and having severe symptoms. Travellers may fly 
at any point within the incubation or symptomatic phases; any would-be travellers who show (severe) symptoms and are hospitalised before 
exit. Vertical lines represent the exit screening at start of travel (solid) and entry screening at end of travel (dashed) 12 hours later.
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infection is symptomatic i.e. has detectable fever, their 
departure time exceeds their incubation period, and 
their stochastic exit screening success indicates detec-
tion. An individual will be detected at entry screening if 
their infection is symptomatic, their incubation period 
ends after their departure but before their arrival, they 
have not been detected at exit screening, and their 
entry screening result is positive despite imperfect sen-
sitivity. Entry screening detections are further divided 
into detection due to severe symptoms and detection 
of mild symptoms via equipment such as thermal scan-
ners. We used 10,000 bootstrap samples to calculate 
95% confidence intervals (CI). 
The model code is available via GitHub [9] and the 
results can be further explored in a Shiny app [10] 
at  https://cmmid-lshtm.shinyapps.io/traveller_screen-
ing/ (Figure 2).
Effect of screening on detection
For the baseline scenario we estimated that 44 (95% 
CI: 33–56) of 100 infected travellers would be detected 
by exit screening, no case (95% CI: 0–3) would develop 
severe symptoms during travel, nine (95% CI: 2–16) 
additional cases would be detected by entry screen-
ing, and the remaining 46 (95% CI: 36–58) would not 
be detected.
The effectiveness of entry screening is largely depend-
ent on the effectiveness of the exit screening in place. 
Under baseline assumptions, entry screening could 
detect 53 (95% CI: 35–72) instead of nine infected trav-
ellers if no exit screening was in place. However, the 
probability of developing symptoms during the flight 
increases with flight time and hence exit screening is 
more effective for longer flights (Figure 3).
Figure 2
Screenshot of Shiny appa displaying the number of travellers infected with novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) detected at 
airport exit and entry screening with baseline assumptionsb, 95% bootstrap confidence intervals, time distributions for 
incubation period and time to severe disease*
a Source [9].
b Baseline assumptions according to the Table.
Results are from stochastic simulation, and so there may be small variations in the number of travellers in each group when the same 
parameters are used twice. Sliders are provided to modify the duration of travel, the sensitivity of both exit and entry screening, the 
proportion symptomatic, and the natural history parameters for the infection.
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Syndromic screening designed to prevent infected 
and potentially infectious cases entering a country 
undetected is highly vulnerable to the proportion of 
asymptomatic infections and long incubation periods. 
If our baseline scenario is modified to have 0% asymp-
tomatic 2019-nCoV infections and 100% sensitivity of 
entry screening, the incubation period will need to be 
around 10-fold shorter than the period from symptom 
onset to severe disease (e.g. hospitalisation) in order 
to detect more than 90% of infected travellers that 
would not otherwise report illness at either exit or 
entry screening.
Discussion and conclusions
As a response to the ongoing outbreak of the 2019-
nCoV originating in Wuhan, exit screening has been 
implemented for international flights leaving China’s 
major airports. Thermal scanning, which can identify 
passengers with fever (high external body tempera-
ture), allows for passengers exhibiting symptoms of 
2019-nCoV infection to be tested before they board a 
plane. Similarly, entry screening for flights originating 
in the most affected regions may be under considera-
tion at airports in regions in and outside China. We 
estimate that the key goal of syndromic screening at 
airports - to prevent infected travellers from entering 
countries or regions with little or no ongoing transmis-
sion - is only achievable if the rate of asymptomatic 
infections that are transmissible is negligible, screen-
ing sensitivity is almost perfect, and the incubation 
period is short. Based on early data from Li et al. [8], 
2019-nCoV appears to have a shorter incubation period 
than severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and 
a higher rate of asymptomatic infections [11]. Under 
generally conservative assumptions on sensitivity, 
we find that 46 of 100 infected travellers will enter 
undetected.
Entry screening is an intuitive barrier for the preven-
tion of infected people entering a country or region. 
However, evidence on its effectiveness remains limited 
and given its lack of specificity, it generates a high 
overhead of screened travellers uninfected with the tar-
geted pathogen [5]. For example, when entry screening 
was implemented in Australia in response to the 2003 
SARS outbreak, 1.84 million people were screened, 794 
were quarantined, and no cases were confirmed [12]. 
While some cases of 2019-nCoV infection have been 
identified through airport screening in the current out-
break, our estimates indicate that likely more infected 
travellers have not been detected by screening.
It is important to note that our estimates are based 
on a number of key assumptions that cannot yet be 
informed directly by evidence from the ongoing 2019-
nCoV outbreak. The current outbreak has spread rapidly 
and early evidence suggests that the average disease 
severity is lower than that of SARS. This may also sug-
gest a substantial proportion of asymptomatic cases. 
A recent analysis of a family transmission cluster is 
based on a small sample size but one in six infections 
was asymptomatic [11]; this is a major impediment for 
the effectiveness of syndromic screening. However, if 
asymptomatic cases were not infectious they would 
not pose a risk for seeding infection chains on arrival. 
To allow easy adaptation of our results as new insight 
becomes available in the coming weeks, we devel-
oped a free interactive online tool, available at https://
cmmid-lshtm.shinyapps.io/traveller_screening/.
While the most up-to-date data on the incubation 
period or the time until recovery from 2019-nCoV infec-
tion have been used in this analysis, these figures are 
likely to change over time as more data become avail-
able. Unless the incubation period is only a small frac-
tion of the duration of infection in relation to that of 
symptomatic disease, and fever in particular, syndro-
mic screening is likely to detect an insufficient fraction 
of infected cases to prevent local infections. In addi-
tion, the sensitivity of airport screening for the detec-
tion of 2019-nCoV has not been evaluated. However, 
we chose conservative estimates and show that with 
reduced sensitivity, the effectiveness of syndromic 
screening would further decline.
In many international airports, information is provided 
to travellers from affected regions recommending 
action if they develop symptoms on or after arrival [13-
16]. Some countries, for example Japan, also require 
incoming passengers to complete forms detailing their 
past and future travel in order to aid tracing [17]. Due 
to the duration of the incubation period of 2019-nCoV 
infection, we find that exit or entry screening at airports 
for initial symptoms, via thermal scanners or similar, is 
unlikely to prevent passage of infected travellers into 
Figure 3
Probability of detecting travellers infected with novel 
coronavirus (2019-nCoV) at airport entry screening by 
travel duration and sensitivity of exit screening
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Each cell is a mean of 10,000 model simulations. Other parameters 
(incubation period, symptom onset to hospitalisation period, and 
proportion of asymptomatic infections) were fixed at baseline 
assumptions (Table). Intervals are probabilities of detection, 
binned at increments of 10% (0–10%, 10–20%, etc.).
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new countries or regions where they may seed local 
transmission.
*Erratum
Figure 2 was replaced on  7 February 2020.
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